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At this writing there is good reason to expect the House of Representatives to pass
a bill "To provide for the adjustment of certain claims against the United States and
to confer jurisdiction in respect thereto on the district courts of the United States,.. .
If enacted the bill provides that the Act may be cited as the "Federal Tort Claims
Act."'
On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt sent to the Senate a message endorsing
the principle of the measure, and urging the passage of such a bill.2 The message
began,
"In these critical days of our national defense effort, I feel there should be a joint endeavor
on the part of the Congress and of the heads of the executive branch of the Government
to divest our minds as far as possible of matters of lesser importance which consume considerable time and effort. We should grant the responsibility for handling such matters to
those equipped with year-round facilities and time to dispose of them."
The President continued, pointing out the enormous number of private claim
bills introduced in each Congress, and decried the expense and delay to the Congress
in continuing the unwieldy procedure?' He quoted statistics based upon the mounting volume of private bills introduced before the country was at war, making it
obvious that the number would increase by reason of the defense and war program.
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6,300 private claim bills introduced in last three Congresses, at cost of over $144,000 per Congress
exclusive of salaries of Congressmen; figures yield average of 2,ooo bills per Congress at a cost of $200
per bill passed. Less than 2o% of bills become law.
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After approving the general provisions of the Tort Claims Bill, the message concluded:
"The passage of such legislation would be of real assistance to the Congress and to the
President at a time when matters of grave national importance demand an ever-increasing
share of our attention. It would also make available a means of dispensing justice simply
and effectively to tort claimants against the Government and give them the same right to
a day in court which claimants now enjoy in fields such as breach of contract, patent
infringement, or admiralty claims."
While the bill thus recommended failed of enactment in the first session of this
Congress, the same bill in amended form has been passed by the Senate 4 and awaits
action by the House. It appears, therefore, that with Presidential sanction, a measure
agitated for over twenty years during peacetime has become of vital importance
during a war period, and will probably become law. The same bill in a similar
version 5 had been recommended for passage since 1938 by the successive Attorneys
General of the United States,0 and has had the endorsement of the American Bar
7
Association and the approval of important state and local bar associations.
GENERAL EFFECT AND PROVISIONS

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to confer on the district courts of the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes of property damage and personal injury claims against the United States which are now barred by reason of the
long-standing immunity of the Government to actions sounding in tort. The only
relief now open to these claimants in most instances is the unsatisfactory procedure

of a private bill in Congress, which is manifestly unfair to both the Government and
to the claimant. The passage of the bill will amount to a waiver of immunity by the
Government and consent to be sued, with certain limitations wisely attached. While
the bill cannot end, of course, the practice of private bills, it will relieve Congressmen
from the pressure for such bills by substituting orderly court proceedings.
Subject to the exception of specific types of claims from the bill, the measure
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district courts sitting without a jury to
adjudicate tort claims up to $io,ooo, arising from the negligence of officers or employees of the Government. To facilitate the handling of small claims, the heads of
each federal agency or their designees are authorized to settle conclusively claims
occasioned by the negligent acts of their employees up to $i,ooo. "Federal agencies"
are defined to include governmental corporations and the several departments and
establishments of the Government. Accordingly, it is provided that even though a
federal agency may generally be sued, that this is no longer true in respect of tort
claims for which, under the bill, the United States is itself answerable.
"See supra note i,see 88 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3267.
'See Hearings, 7.
a REr. Arr'y GEN. (938) 10, id. (1939) 9; letter of Att'v General Biddle to Congressman Summers,

Report, at

12.

764 A. B. A. REP. 2o9 (939).
An able brief supporting the legislation was prepared in 194o by
Mr. Jenner of the Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, and distributed among
the members of the Judiciary Committees of Congress.
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If the claim exceeds $i,ooo or if it is for a lesser amount and either settlement is
not reached or the claimant prefers to sue at once, he may bring suit in a district
court of the district in which he resides or in which injury occurred. After a claim
has been submitted to a federal agency for an administrative settlement, no suit may
be brought unless the claim is finally disposed of by the agency or is withdrawn from
it by the claimant upon 15 days' notice. In either case the claimant is limited in his
suit to the sum claimed originally from the agency, unless an increased amount is
justified by newly discovered evidence or intervening facts. After suit is brought, the
Attorney General "with a view to doing substantial justice" may settle the claim.
While the bill passed by the Senate vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the
Circuit Courts of Appeal the House Judiciary Committee's version provides that, if
the parties so agree, the Court of Claims shall take the place of the Circuit Court of
Appeals as a court of review. This novel provision if enacted, promises to revive
discussions" of the proper place, in the hierarchy of federal tribunals, of the Court of
Claims as a "legislative" court. It is not easy to see why such concurring appellate
jurisdiction should be established.9 Certainly, the Circuit Courts of Appeal are more
familiar with the all-important local law and are within easier reach of the claimant
than the Court of Claims sitting in Washington.
Practice and procedure in such suits is expressly made subject to the Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States. The provisions for
counterclaims, set-off, and payment of judgment are the same as those applicable to
contract suits in the district courts under the Tucker Act.
With regard to substantive law, the bill expressly provides for the application of
the law of torts of the place where the negligent or.wrongful act occurred, in other
words, the United States is made liable to the claimants as a private individual would
be under like circumstances. The local law is thus applicable to the merits of the
claim and to defenses such as contributory negligence and wilful misconduct, and
also determines the effect of the claimant's death on his cause of action.
However, the rule of local law is qualified by important restrictions. Thus, the
United States will not be liable for punitive damages, interests, or costs. 9' The acceptance of an award by the claimant in an administrative settlement or the recovery of
judgment will release not merely his claims against the United States but against the
negligent employee as well. This protection afforded the tortfeasor does not, of
course, prevent the taking of disciplinary measures against him if those are indicated.
In the event some other party be jointly liable with the Government, the bill limits
recovery against the United States to its proportionate liability, rather than the usual
'Cf. Hearings, 18.
' The Committee Report refers to the President's Message to Congress as indicating the desirability of

having the Court of Claims exercise appellate jurisdiction, see Report, at ii. A prior bill had vested
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to achieve "uniformity of administration," Hearings,
2,

22.

" The House Committee's version permits recovery of cosg, not including attorney's fees, see Report,
2, 7.
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recovery of joint and several judgment against joint tort feasors. 5 The following
specific claims are expressly excepted: (i) loss or miscarriage of postal matter, (2)
claims arising in respect to collection of any tax or goods held by any law enforcement officer, (3) admiralty claims, (4) property seized under Trading with the
Enemy Act, (5) quarantine claims, (6) injury to vessels, cargo, crew and passengers
while in the Panama Canal Zone waters, (7) compensation under Federal Employees'
Compensation Act and Veterans' Act, (8) assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights, a nuisance not involving negligence,90 (9) damages by Treasury
Department in fiscal operations, (io) activities of armed forces in war time, and
(ii) any claim arising in a foreign country in behalf of an alien."'
In addition, a general clause precludes the application of the act to:
"(i) Any claims based upon"(a) The exercise or performance [of] or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused; or
"(b) An act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,
whether or not alleged to be wrongful in the execution of a program, project, statute or
regulation, valid or invalid."
At first blush, it would seem that a claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee "exercising due care" would fail to state a cause of action and that therefore
the provision is redundant. However, the intent' ° seems to have been to preclude
absolute liability of the Government for injuries arising in the course of lawful
activities like flood control, dam or irrigation projects, a liability which might be
imposed on an individual engaged in comparable work. But this is not the only
purpose of the provision. For the denial of the claim even where the statute or
regulation under which the Government employee acted was invalid might indicate
a second legislative intent: to preclude the creation of a "governmental tort" doctrine
based on the idea of governmental action without constitutional or statutory authority. This purpose is further made clear by the first paragraph of the section which
denies liability for the results of the exercise of, or failure to exercise any discretionary
function or duty on the part of a government agency or employee even where the
discretion is abused. In the Congressional committee hearings the Government representative summarized 1 this purpose of the section in the following words:
"It is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of
regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act, should be tested through
" The House Committee's version lets the local law decide the liability of the United States in the case
of joint tortfeasance, see Report, 12.
0 The House Committee's version omitted the exclusion of claims based on a "nuisance not involving
negligence" because it deemed the general exclusion of claims based on authorized acts by government
officers or employees exercising due care sufficiently broad to include this particular problem, ibid.
"0The House Committee also excluded claims arising out of activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority or of persons "in the protective services engaged in civilian defense" unless they are "also an officer or
employee of the Office of Civilian Defense duly appointed as such," Report, 1, 4, 12.
"sHearings,33.
'z Ibid.
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the medium of a damage suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative action
not of a regulatory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execution of a
Federal project, and the like."
A limitation of one year is placed on all actions unless suit is filed or written claim
presented to the particular agency head, and in the latter instance an additional
period of six months is granted the claimant from the date of mailing of notice by
the agency as to the final disposition of the claim or from the date of his withdrawal
of the claim from the agency. Fees of claimants' attorneys are limited to a maximum
of 2o% recovered by suit and ioo under awards from the agency heads with severe
penalties for violations; this restriction, however, does not apply to recoveries of less
than $500. The percentages allowed as maximum fees were not commented on by
President Roosevelt in his message to the Congress of January 14, 1942, and may be
said, therefore, to have his tacit consent and approval. The bill repeals all existing
acts giving department heads power to pay claims based on tortious conduct, but
saves all those where such power of settlement for claims where non-tortious conduct
is involved.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Under present conditions, the Government enjoys total immunity from tort actions,
and is suable under any circumstances only by consent. This concept is a judicial
misconstruction of the ancient maxim that "The King can do no wrong," carried
over from the English common law, but wholly inapplicable to our form of government. The idea has become too firmly entrenched in our judicial system now, however, to be reversed by judicial decision, and requires this remedial legislation.
Like all rules of law, the idea has been rationalized.
"It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign
cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission. The
doctrine rests on reasons of public policy,--the inconvenience and danger which would
follow from any different rule." 26 R. C. L. 1458, United States, §63.12
In recent decisions, the Court announces the principle in a single sentence as
requiring no explanation or citations.
"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1940).
In the case of Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation'3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter tersely criticizes the origin of the doctrine:
"As to the States, legal irresponsibility was written into the eleventh amendment; as
to the United States, it is derived by implication.... For present purposes, it is academic
is "It is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to be inconvenienced." Russell v. Men
of Devon, 2 T. R. 667 (1788), xoo Eng. Repr. 359.
(The government) does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of the
"...
officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments and difficulties, and losses which would be subversive of the public interests." Robertson v. Sickel
127 U. S. 507 (x886), quoting from Story, COMa tE1TARES oN THE LAw o5 AGENCY (8th ed. by Green.
1874) §319.
is 306 U. S. 381, 388 (1938).
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to consider whether this exceptional freedom from legal responsibility rests on the theory
that the United States is deemed the institutional decendant of the Crown, enjoying its
immunity but not its historical prerogatives ... or on a metaphysical doctrine 'that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.'"
The probable origin of the doctrine of governmental immunity is thoroughly dis14
cussed in a series of articles beginning in 1924 by Professor Edwin M. Borchard,
and is analytically criticized by Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, in a forceful article supporting the Tort Claims Bill of 1939.11
With this comprehensive treatment of the fundamental subject already contributed
to the storehouse of legal lore, further elucidation of the principle would be repetition. Professor Borchard has been a persistent advocate of remedial legislation for
over 25 years, and the Committees of Congress have recognized the evil of the existing system."6 In fact, the need for reform may be said to have been judicially recognized in a fairly recent opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, wherein he said :1
"... we start from the premise that such waiver by Congress of governmental immunity
in case of such federal instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy is in line
with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as evidenced
by the increasing tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal governmental
corporations are concerned."
Prior to the introduction of the 1939 Tort Claims Bill, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented on the growing dissatisfaction with the doctrine of immunity, specifically
pointing out an earlier Tort Claims Bill,' 8 saying:19
"Acting on these views, Congress passed a general Court of Claims bill, which, however, at the dose of the session failed of enactment by Coolidge's pocket-veto.... Congress
has thus clearly manifested an attitude which serves as a guide to the scope of liability
implicit in the general authorization it has conferred on governmental corporations to sue
and be sued. We should be denying the recent trend of Congressional policy to relieve
Regional from liability."
24 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924)

34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229; Borchard, Governmental

Responsibility in Tort (1924) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, x039; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort
(1928) 28 COL. L. RaV. 577; Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 COL.
L. REv. 734.
15 Tort Claims against the United States (1939) 25 A. B. A.-J. 828.
' "In other words, it may be said that Congress has recognized the general liability of the Government
within maximum amounts for the negligence of officers and employees of the United States, but the
machinery for determining that liability is defective and results in overburdening the Claims Committee of
Congress and Congress itself with the consideration of tort liability claims and with injuries to the
claimants." Senate Report No. 1699, 7oth Cong., 2d Sess. 4. See also Senate Report No. 658, 72nd Cong.,
Ist Sess. 3.

"'Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245 (939).
"I H. R. 9285, S. 4377, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., which passed both Houses in 1929 "only to be given a
pocket veto by President Coolidge, presumably because of the Attorney General's objection to that provision of the bill, as then drafted, enabling the Comptroller General to 'settle' and determine the validity
of the claim and act as counsel for the United States... . Inasmuch as the Attorney General has customarily been the only legal official to defend the United States in the Court of Claims, this innovation was
considered objectionable by him." Borchard, The Federal Torts Claim Bill (1933) a U. o, Cin. L. Rav. s.
See also McGuire, Tort Claims against the United States (1931) 19 GEo. L. J. 133.
" Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381, 397 (1938).
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While the above cases seem to be liberalizing the doctrine of immunity in allowing suits against governmental corporations on the ground that the statutes creating
them conferred power "to sue and be sued," the Court earlier indicated that this
right to be sued might be limited if "interference" were shown. 2 °
"In the present case it does not appear that the attachment would directly interfere with
any function performed by petitioner as a federal instrumentality. We reserve the question
whether a different result would be required if such an interference were shown."
The line of demarcation, anticipated above, was drawn very recently by the Court,
wherein it called a halt on its liberal construction of the Congressional intent to make
government corporations amenable to suit, and refused to extend its liberality to
permit state taxation of the corporation. 2 '
NEcEsSITY

FOR ENACTMENT OF BILL

Although the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit does not appear in
the Constitution or statute-law, and in spite of the fact that in the body of unwritten
law it is derived by implication only, nevertheless remedial legislation is required to
22
change the law.
"The general principle of immunity of a sovereign state from suit without its express
consent is too deeply imbedded in our law to be uprooted by judicial decision."
The enactment of the bill would not be in the nature of an innovation, as the
Government's immunity to suit has been waived by Congress through various Acts
since 1855 when the Court of Claims was established (io Stat. 612). All subsequent
amendments to the first Act 2 3 have continued to restrict the permissible claims to
those founded upon implied contract or a federal statute, and jurisdiction is restricted
to cases "not sounding in tort." The Court's decisions have further limited the actions
to contracts implied in fact and not implied in law, and a claimant whose action
sounds in tort may not waive the tort and sue in assumpsit on the theory of quasi
contract.2 4 This state of the law leads to the unwholesome conclusion that the more
wanton and careless the conduct of the government employees, the less danger of
incurring actionable liability on the part of the Government.2 5
Furthermore, Congress has permitted admiralty and maritime claims against the
United States without limitation as to amount,2 6 and suits for patent infringement
against the Government are allowed.2 7 These concessions do not appear to have been
"oFederal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 237 (i934).
"'Federal Land Bank v. Bisrhark Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95

(i94i).
2' The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); see excellent collection of authorities cited there.
2324 Stat. 505 (1887), 36 Stat. 1136 (i9ii),
28 U. S. C. §25o (1934), 28 U. S. C. §42 (2o) (2934).

"Great

Falls Mfg. Co. v. U. S., x6 Ct. Cl. i6o, aff'd

Investment Co., 27, U. S.
"The more flagrant
commendable principle of
2 41 Stat. 525 (920),

2,2

112

U. S. 645 (884),

U. S. v. Minnesota Mutual

(1925).

and unjustifiable the Government's act, the less becomes its liability, hardly a
law." Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (X924), 34 Y~a.a L. J. 1, 31.
46 U. S. C. §742 (1934).

2735 U. S. C. §68 (1934), 36 Stat. 85i
gesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290 (1912).

(1910), 40

Stat. 705 (i918), Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktien-
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abused by claimants, and have functioned satisfactorily. Beginning with 1912, there
have been numerous Acts passed permitting departmental adjustment of personal
injury and property damage claims not exceeding $i,ooo. 2 1 This limit is probably

wise considering the non-judicial manner of departmental adjustment of small
claims, and is retained in the proposed legislation. Under existing law the claimant
is given no alternative, however, and cannot appeal from the treatment accorded.
The bill affords the claimant "his day in court," and does not force him to rely solely
upon the discretion of administrative officers. There is no basis in fact for allowing
small claims to be paid and denying larger ones in toto, nor is there any valid distinction between the present system of allowing admiralty and patent infringement
claims and denying other torts. The Tort Claims Bill extends the salutary features
to all claims of the existing29 partial regulation to all claims.
The limitations contained in the pending bill are discussed at length above. Their
very number indicates an effort to achieve safeguards against possible abuse. After
the legislation becomes law and the new system thoroughly tested, other possible
amendments may become the subject of consideration by Congress.
President Roosevelt in his message to Congress has pointed out the defects of
private claim bills. Suffice it to say that they are highly unsatisfactory both from the
standpoint of Congress and the claimant. The Tort Claims Bill provides for a
sensible and comprehensive system under which the handling of tort claims in an
orderly judicial manner may be accomplished. The passage of the bill will greatly
improve the administration of justice.
"SComprehensive Act permitting department heads to make settlement, 42 Stat. io66 (1922), 31
U. S. C. §215 ('934). Postmaster General, limited to $500, 42 Stat. 63 (192x), 48 Stat. 1207, 5 U. S. C.
§392 (x934). Secretary of War, 5 U. S. C. A., §208, 31 U. S. C. A., §§223, 224. For criticism of red-tape
and unsatisfactory manner of these adjustments, see Administration of Tort Claims in the War Department
(942)
1o Gao. WAsH. L. RaV. 473. Secretary of Interior, 25 U. S. C. A., §388; Secretary of Agriculture,
46 Stat. 387; Attorney General, 5 U. S. C. A., §300(b); Director of Coast and Geodetic Survey, 33
U. S. C. A. §853.
"°For a list of statutes to be repealed by the enactment of the bill, see Report, 13.

